"I can't say I'm getting anything out of it," the teacher says, adding: "Parents don't either" (Winerip, 2003, p. A16) .
Why this preoccupation with numbers? The issue is not whether to use numbers in our daily lives, in our sciences, in our governing-but to question their meaning. When does our preoccupation with numbers lead to inappropriate use of measurement? The rule, much ignored, is fairly simple: No how much before a what. You cannot measure how much of something you have before knowing what it is you have. Why is this rule systemically ignored?
In dealing with the autistic child, none of the content of his actual experience can be captured in a number. For those who treat such cases, the concept autism serves to catch what can be generalized about a particular; it leaves out what is unique to this actual child. The numbers used at the top of the education pyramid say nothing to the working teacher about either the concept or the experience. They say nothing about the actuality of teaching this autistic child named Eric. Yet the top will determine budget allocations on the basis of such numbers.
MANAGING KNOWLEDGE IN ORGANIZATIONS
What are the origins of our enchantment with numbers? Why is there magic in it when someone tells us the chances of a work operation succeeding are 50-50 rather than saying they are even? Why are we impressed when someone tells us the chances of a space shuttle's failing are 1 in 100,000? Why is talk of tolerances of 1/1000th of an inch more impressive than saying this thing does not fit? Can we somehow manage numbers knowledge-its use and misuse?
Beyond the precincts of public and business administration, among experts in the field of information technology, there is a growing sense of the meaninglessness of pure numerical information cut loose from its moorings. The avalanche of numbers constituting computerized information cannot be managed for any practical purpose merely by the numbers. Counting the bits or the bytes is no measure of applicability or productivity. A lone number gives no clue as to its application for practical use. In short, the sword that cuts through the Gordian knot of how to weigh and value information is to ask Of what human use is it?
Information is not yet knowledge. The test of every bit of information claiming to be knowledge is whether it can be put to some use by someone who does the work. Along these lines, knowledge studies, extruded from what used to be the monolithic information technology field, are being brought under one roof under the label of knowledge management.
Knowledge management tries to make sense out of the myriad bits of information set loose on the world by finding contexts within which data become meaningful. An axiom is that knowledge changes as organization changes (and vice versa)-and that management is called on to do something about it.
Within public administration, the organization theorist Frederick Thayer (1980) pointed early on to the utility of the philosophy of science in this regard when he noted that every time we design an organization we are also choosing a theory of knowledge. Every organization theory is an epistemology.
Contributing fields claimed by knowledge management include the practice of knowledge management itself, organizational learning, organizational information processing and information technology, situated learning, knowledge communication, transfer and replication, knowledge as capability of the firm, studies in innovation and change, and the philosophy of knowledge (Subramani, Nerur, & Mahapatra, n.d.) . 2 Utilization is mostly confined to business administration. Yet there are obvious concerns for all of organization theory and design. Knowledge management affects research methodology, political choices, public administration, public management, policy analysis and implementation, and program evaluation. For example, can there be research and programs without numbers? When is the use of numbers inappropriate? Must evaluation be done in terms of numbers, or must the numbers first be placed in a context that leads to evaluation? Here we may only begin to address such concerns by uncovering prejudgments we make when we lean toward treating numbers as knowledge. In short, we will consider the use of numbers as prejudicial to other forms of human knowledge.
KNOWLEDGES (PLURAL!) IN ORGANIZATIONS
What is the place of numbers and knowledge in modern organizations? It is a commonplace to depict these as pyramids of power. In such pyramids, the most powerful rule from the top; they are elite. The least powerful do the work at the bottom; they are mass. The justification for ascending levels of power is, strangely enough, that those at the top are also those most in the know. This is strange because this equation of power with knowledge ignores another observation: Few top administrators or CEOs know how to do the work of production or service provision. Nor do they 60 ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY / March 2006 have midmanagers' expertise in designing production technology and managing the workforce. At best, the administrative or executive elite can claim a monopoly on a kind of knowledge of the financial numbers. In short, the elite claims to know how much without first knowing what is being measured.
You would think that such observations speak to a plurality of knowledges, each its own power base. Still, no one denies and everyone assumes-all evidence to the contrary-the right of the boss to impose his or her will. Authority claims to be knowledge based. What can explain our acceptance of this claim against all evidence?
If knowledge is the knower's stance toward the world, 3 then there is more than one kind of knowledge in modern organizations. Each level of authority exhibits and defends its own knowledge system with its own axioms or presuppositions. 4 But it may also be that the power differential is explained by the fact that each kind of knowledge produces its own kind of power: financial power, management power, working power.
Say, for the sake of argument, that there are three kinds of knowledges (plural!).
5 This hypothetical falls well within our range of experience. The elite in the executive suite claims position for itself by the numbers. At its scientific best, midmanagement trades on possessing objective knowledge; for example, there is managers'conceptual ability to freeze the fluid experience of work into jobs. Only those at the bottom are stuck with a stance that leaves them wide open to direction and criticism from above. They must take this stance. Being open laterally means to be able to take cues from the work itself. And being open upward toward direction and criticism enables them to fit what they do-work-into the job as defined from above.
A KNOWLEDGE ANALYTIC
Kinds of knowledge, of course, are distinguished by some difference in foundation. Chronic misunderstandings and conflict suggest the three kinds of knowledge observable in organizations are not members of the same family but are incommensurable. Each not only fails to share a common set of referents with the others but claims superiority for its own axioms and thereby obscures and suppresses the functioning of other knowledges in their own domains.
Such incompatibility in knowledges is the target of what has been called a knowledge analytic.
6 A knowledge analytic takes apart an organization's whole knowledge structure in search of the distribution and interHummel / TRIUMPH OF NUMBERS 61 action of knowledges and power. It thus offers a knowledge-conflict explanation for the recurrent failures in the giving and taking of orders endemic in modern organizations (cf. Follett, 1925 Follett, /1977 . 7 Such analysis attempts to see through the emptiness of quarterly reports, the disparity between legislative budgets and agency performance, the need for repeated management reforms, and workers' sense of being misunderstood and underappreciated.
We may also find in such exploration of knowledges an answer to the conundrum over whether a monolithic science of management can serve varied forms of public administration (cf. Stivers, 2003; White, 1999; White & Adams, 1994) .
THE PROBLEM OF FORCED COMMENSURABILITY
If knowledge and authority are legitimately allied in people's minds, it is of course possible to get people to behave according to numbers knowledge or conceptual knowledge and have them deny their own experience.
Yet different kinds of knowledge produce different kinds of power. Knowledge incommensurability can be found in any system of organizing that honors only the masters of free-floating numbers.
8 Such a system of numbers and their relations among one another may be valued as superior by executives and administrators who deal with ideas and measures unsullied by reality. But, anchored in no empirical or working reality, such idealities merely float. They are detached from the objects they once conceptually defined and measured and are far distant from the raw material of experience that was the basis for concepts. Numbers become more real than what they refer to. Soon we find ourselves in an abstract system in which neither numerator nor denominator any longer refers to what in the world is being counted or named. Of such empty measures are financial market bubbles made and, to cite an example from public administration, budget statistics of a war on terror that do not first define what terrorism is or aims at.
Yet incommensurability is also there where numbers function as measurements still tied to real objects. There, in science, the real is restricted to what can be captured in a net of criteria. Inevitably, this net captures what is true in general but lets most of direct experience of the work slip through its mesh.
Thus, a health researcher is told to translate qualitative descriptions of patient well-being into numbers: "Otherwise we can't use our statistics." Or a space shuttle engineer opposing a launch under questionable condi- tions tells of being told to "quantify my concerns, and I said I couldn't." Or both management and labor refuse to define caseload in a state welfare agency because such definition "would ignite a numbers game." 9 We all may have some empathy with this problem if we are teachers judged by the numbers of students we teach, researchers judged by the number of grants applied for or the number of publications recorded, or ordinary citizens who find government "has our number." Yet we submit. How did we get that way? Or, more formally, how does the ascendance of numbers over production's objects and working experience develop? To ask this question is to ask how ideas can overwhelm the real. Here we can carry over a critical answer from the philosophy of science.
GENESIS OF KNOWLEDGES: A LESSON FROM SCIENCE
The tendency of numbers to float away from what they describe is also questioned in the world of the natural sciences. For an example with wide implications, we may draw on the work done by an expert in both the use of numbers and the questioning of their disconnection from human issues. The mathematician turned philosopher Edmund Husserl tries to explain the development of modern idealism-a mathesis universalis-by exploring a series of transformations. In this series of transformations, knowledge developed in material practice yields to knowledge focused on method, and knowledge focused on the inner criteria of method in turn becomes technique.
Husserl's explanation comes to us admittedly as a reconstruction. But this is a procedure well known in the history of philosophy.
10 The philosopher as historian tries to envision a sequence of development that most completely gives insight into a current phenomenon. In this case, Husserl reconstructs how a mathematized kind of knowledge must have developed if we are to account for its current condition, including its detached domination of everyday experience. The true test of this theorized sequence is whether it gives us insights into our problems of knowledge use that we would not have had otherwise.
Husserl shows us what is gained and what is lost. As number systems replace scientific constructs, just as science forced the submission of everyday practices and know-how, he sees the primacy of human purposes reduced to an interest in ever more refined technique. 11 Technique is taken as the product of a human concern for honing and sharpening ever more precise methods by reference to inner standards of these methods Hummel / TRIUMPH OF NUMBERS 63 rather than by reference to the original human purposes. This temptation is made possible by introducing into our concerns the functions of independent numbers. These subject reality to a new criterion: Does it meet the test not of satisfying human purpose but of satisfying the logic of the numbers? No longer is the question Does the project make sense? The question is Do the numbers add up?
To demonstrate how this might have become so, Husserl casts a jaundiced eye on the development of land surveying. He shows how the nittygritty know-how of surveying is abstracted into the ideal shapes of geometry (which in turn are dissolved into the pure numbers of algebra). In his own words, he asks, "How does geometric ideality (just like that of all sciences) [italics added] proceed from its primary intrapersonal origin, where it is a structure within the conscious space of the first inventor's soul, to its ideal objectivity?" (Husserl, 1936 /1970 .
We may well ask ourselves, What can we learn about the rise of modern knowledge in general-an ideally numbers-oriented knowledge structure "just like that of all sciences"-from tracing abstract geometry back to such an earthy purpose as the surveying of land? 12 I here amplify Husserl's argument by paying attention to changes in language that accompany the stages of development he suggests.
CASE: FROM EARTH MEASURERS TO GEOMETRY
"The geometry of idealities," Husserl writes, "was preceded by the practical art of surveying, which knew nothing of idealities" (Husserl, 1936 (Husserl, /1970 . In other words, how does a human practice become an idea that then claims the ability to determine what is real? We can take an initial stab at illustrating Husserl's answer by looking at the word origins and family tree of geometry.
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Geometry, Husserl (1936 Husserl ( /1970 writes, began as "a structure within the conscious space of the first inventor's soul" (p. 358). It ended up as a way of thinking that subordinates, for example, actual experience with triangular shapes-measuring a triangular piece of land-to the ideal triangle constructed in our minds. The ideal shape then becomes the measure of all actual shapes we may encounter. Later, the mathematical formula becomes the measure of all actual forms-of art, craft, or life in general. We can see that this development exemplifies our civilization's transformation from human centered to numbers centered. This is a world in Man and human concerns were very much present at the creation of geometry in the art of surveying. Yet when we trace geometry, the word, to its origins, abstraction from practical human purposes immediately becomes evident. Although geometry traces its ancestry to surveying, the Greek word for measuring the earth is not geometry. That would have been the reasonable result of combining geo and metresis. The surveyor is not originally a geometer. Instead, the word for him in my Greek dictionary is skopos.
To survey is originally periskopeo. The term still lives whenever we look around or are on the lookout-through a telescope, a microscope, a periscope. A skopos is not just a man who measures the earth. (That would be a geometer.) Although he issues some of the early rules of what is later called geometry, the skopos is an earthy individual, salt of the earth. Geometric abstractions are merely instruments for him so he can look out for something on behalf of someone.
The skopos scopes out someone's property interests as represented by property lines. He is defined by the purpose for the sake of which he works, not by merely being true to his method. That this may seem strange to us today indicates how much we have become the prisoners of method, which-to cite one handicap-cannot tell us where and when to apply it. The skopos is never so far removed from his purpose as to find himself in this embarrassment. In contrast, the classical geometrician is defined by how close he comes to observing geometry as a method. The geometric axioms are applicable in principle any time to anything spatial anywhere. The skopos, always involved in the particular place, needed to pay attention to the give and take required by the situation.
It may be significant that although, in our day of universally applicable abstractions, we may speak of geometricians, the skopos did not make it into the geometric vocabulary. We do not refer to skopoi. Surveying underwent a change in which method became separated from practice and purpose. Again, the skopos uses geometric devices as tools, but these are vindicated by their utility to land-surveying purposes, not primarily by adherence to method. The geometrician is measured by method.
How could this have become so? As staking out the land yields to the more handy and precise tracing of geometric shapes on paper, emphasis shifts to the way of surveying: Only now do we get the geometer-from earth measurement (geo and metresis). Not until we survey by (meta) the same way (hodos), over and over again, does our attention shift to the way instead of the purpose. Meta and hodos become methodos-method.
Once we become conscious of method as a distinct object for reflection, we refine it from the inside out and allow it to become separated from its physical origins.
Surveying in this way (i.e., methodically) works independent of the specific landscape in which measuring originated and was contained. Attention to method emerges for entirely human reasons: What repeatedly works is valued as the way by which (meta and hodos) to workmethod. Its refinement leads beyond method to technique, as competition between different ways of carrying out the method sharpens it.
Say we desire to make legal claims on property. It has just reemerged after the annual flooding of a river. It is soon observed that the man best qualified to look out for someone's property is the one who best knows the ways of measuring the earth. This individual after generations becomes known no longer merely by what he aims at, his purpose, as a skopos, but by his method: as a geometretes, a geometer. His skill is elevated to a method that can be used outside the original context: geometry. And that skill is sharpened by continuous self-criticism, yielding sharper and sharper technique. Technique orients itself by comparing one procedure against another, not against the ultimate goal or purpose. With this elevation of method and its refinement into technique comes a marked increase in the range of application-and therefore of power.
STAGES IN DEVELOPMENT OF MEASUREMENT
The steps of the transition away from the original practical skill of measurement as retraced by Husserl (1936 Husserl ( /1970 are the following.
• First, there is the development of a formal geometry out of survey practice.
• Second, there is the replacement of geometry's shapes by a pure arithmetic.
• Third, there now occurs a preoccupation with perfecting method, tending to devolve into technique careless of its practical consequences.
These developments have serious effects on human life and work, including detachment from human purpose, false priority placed on method, increasing inward looking on the part of methodologists, and the rise of detached technique.
THE LOSS OF PURPOSE
In the first transformation, the skopos transitions into the geometer. Formal geometry works no longer with the ambiguity of rough shapes of land, obstructing hills, deep pathless woods, treacherous swamps, or deep-cut vales as these are valued by human concerns. It deals with more precise shapes detached from mundane concerns of the land owner, the purchaser, the surveyor, the advocate, the judge, and so on. These more precise shapes are imagined in the mind and set on paper. For example, the demonstrated properties of an isosceles triangle are treated as axiomatic of all such triangles, and all future isosceles shapes are judged by their measuring up to the axiomatic triangle: All isosceles pieces of land are in the geometric sense equal. It is, however, not true that it is all the same to a landowner which isosceles piece of land he can claim as his own. (And besides, the reference of inquiry into shapes has now already progressed further: From the viewpoint of pure mathematics, even the more precise shapes of the new geometry begin to look like mere approximations.)
TOWARD THE TRIUMPH OF NUMBERS
In the second transformation, there is the further perfection in precision of our knowledge of shapes and space through development of a pure arithmetic. No actual triangle can be drawn as perfectly as its mathematical representation is perfect. The key is to operate with measures of equal length. Such unitary measure not only allows the equation of everything measurable but the unification of particular knowledges into a general system: What in Arabic was called algebra (from al-jebr-reunification) . This pure math now abandons and replaces geometry's working with shapes. Algebra translates the measurement of shapes into numbers. Numbers are in turn represented by totally abstract symbols. The new system unites numbers into sets under a rule.
In the third transformation emerges the natural tendency to constantly refine and re-refine method according to a method's inner standards such as logical noncontradiction or coherence. The shift of emphasis is toward, in a word, technique.
THE FOCUS ON METHOD
Use of units of equal length on a measuring stick makes it possible to quantify all things as if they could be captured under one common denominator. The result is a series of perfect formulas to replace the shapes approximated on paper. The geometer now turns inward into paying separate attention to the measurement system itself. The issue is no longer Hummel / TRIUMPH OF NUMBERS 67 whether a shape on paper is adequate to our use of a physical landscape but whether the formula proves out according to internal rules: Adequation yields to equation, and measurement yields to method. However, applying a yardstick to a topography of nature is no more taking its measure than applying it to a man's physique is taking the measure of the man.
Here begins a transformation of a science of visible shapes and human concerns into a system of symbols and their relation, though such symbols are real only to the mind's eye. Knowing breaks off from dependence on what can be seen by the organic eye. Once what could be seen was shapes drawn on paper and the lay of the land inasmuch as it resisted or yielded to human purposes. Knowing had a material referent and a practical use. Now knowing is what we can make of things without reference to things. From the viewpoint of the yeoman, the world seems put together arbitrarily, its givens treated as data.
What we encounter is recognized only insofar as it yields reference to numbers and their logic. Number is freed from its origins of getting the measure of something that has a direct meaning in life-such as pacing off a property line to establish ownership. Number no longer is an analog to what can be seen-as early geometry's shapes were analogs of lines of sight paced off across the earth. Number becomes the template in terms of which everything must be seen.
Of such an "arithmetization of geometry," Husserl (1936 Husserl ( /1970 ) says that it leads almost automatically "to the emptying of its meaning," so that in algebra "one lets the geometric significations recede into the background as a matter of course, indeed drops it altogether; one calculates, remembering only at the end that the numbers signify magnitudes" (p. 44).
From this knowing of the numbers as sets obeying internal rules, there is no road back to empirical or experiential reality. From mathematics, it is no longer possible to deduce a return to the sense of this nurse having this healthy patient, the feel for the space shuttle named Challenger as a whole, the proportionality of these social workers and clients, the touch of this autistic child-do you remember his name?-Eric.
The end result, in Husserl's (1936 Husserl's ( /1970 own words is this: "In geometrical and natural-scientific mathematization, in the open infinity of possible experiences, we measure the life-world-the world constantly given to us as actual in our concrete world-life-for a well-fitting garb of ideas, that of the so-called objectively scientific truths." Even before we meet Eric, "we first construct numerical indices" limiting "the actual and possible sensible" fullness of what we will consider to be an autistic child.
This construct is never Eric, the child we behold in the natural attitude. The indices prejudge life and world and delineate these in rational shapes, "and in this way we obtain possibilities of predicting concrete occurrences in the intuitively given life-world" (p. 51).
What we claim to see at first glance-in a first beholding-is already dressed up through mathematics and mathematical science. The world and Eric appear fitted into a Procrustean bed, dressed in "a garb of ideas, or the garb of symbols of symbolic mathematical theories." This tailoring takes the world we live in and "dresses it up as 'objectively actual and true' nature" (Husserl 1936 (Husserl /1970 . A methodological autism meets Eric's.
THE RISE OF TECHNIQUE
Further consequences follow from this taking "for true being what is actually a method." For method "is designed for the purpose of progressively improving, in infinitum, through 'scientific' predictions, those rough predictions which are the only ones originally possible within the sphere of what is actually experienced and experienceable in the lifeworld" (Husserl 1936 (Husserl /1970 .
The effect of such concern for the infinite self-improvement of method is called technique. We may recognize it, disguised as it is, in today's call for continuous improvement issued by the various gurus of quality management. Here the living breathing individual worker in his or her full plenitude is tailored to contribute his or her own wrinkle to wearing the garb of utmost efficiency. Management may announce as the initial aim the liberation of working knowledge to moderate the excesses of idealized production without utility (e.g., automobiles produced in the early 1980s that could not be relied on for transportation). But, in response to the unforgiving pressure of financial markets and government budgets, actual working knowledge so freed up is soon recaptured under criteria set by those least acquainted with what it takes to do quality work.
The rise of technique excludes "the original thinking that genuinely gives meaning to this technical process and truth to the correct results." A return to this meaning and this truth, however, would have to be gained by nurturing a thinking that is "actually directed at the subject matter itself" (Husserl 1936 (Husserl /1970 .
From there it is only a small step, not so much to a devaluing of working knowledge, as to repeated pogroms aimed at taming if not extinguish- Hummel / TRIUMPH OF NUMBERS 69 ing its threat to those who delineate the shape of things to come-whether in production or in life.
A LESSON FOR GENERAL APPLICATION?
Why this tale? This reconstruction of a history for which there is no absolute proof. The test will be whether it gives us insight into our own predicament.
What is this predicament? Not to put too fine a point on it, our predicament is that we trust the numbers more than we trust people. Yet numbers were made for man, not man for the numbers. The artist does not paint by the numbers, nor does life paint itself in gray on gray with even strokes so philosophy and science can encompass it. There are serious consequences for our failure to understand the gap between being alive and what we know about it.
Mismeasure threatens wherever these conditions exist:
• Where we abandon concerned know-how for a distinct knowledge that follows its own rules.
• Where we are tempted to smooth out the imperfect shapes of daily life and make them clear and perfect in a calculus of perfection.
• Where we advance to an even higher level of perfection by replacing both concerned know-how and the approximations of early mathematical thinking with the independent thinking of technique.
There are predictions too. These implicate individuals, the organization, the society, and the civilization.
INDIVIDUAL MISMEASURE
For the individual-as in the case of the autistic child-management of production or administrative services will continue to pay more and more attention to what can be measured. In Eric's case, this meant designing a program to identify the gap between criteria and achievement. But for everyone, the tendency is to reduce those tolerances that could possibly be tightened in an efficiency crusade of a future date, aimed at reducing the measurable gap with an eye out for costs. It beats having to be responsible for the actual, but often immeasurable, improvement off this or that actual child's condition or the production of effective goods and services of actual utility to this or that individual.
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To return to the case of the autistic child: At the policy level and at the management level, every tool aiding generalization is provided but no tool to make sure this child or that child each gets care appropriate to himself or herself. In designing a measurable program, we make sure that what is most measurable about autistic children in general is what the program will pay the most attention to, and what is most commensurate with a particular child will be paid the least attention to. Stephen Jay Gould called this the mismeasure of man. Immanuel Kant already decried the loss of judgment required in deriving particular acts merely logically from general rules.
We now have an idea of the origin of such mismeasure as, for example, the IQ tests Gould attacked. There is a distance between the experience of autism and its generalized description, between child and program, between intelligence of one child as compared to others and a quotient that functions as a criterion by which to measure intelligence of all children. These distances exactly parallel the distance developed over time in the development from original land surveying to a universal mathematics.
ORGANIZATIONAL MISMEASURE
The implications can be put in larger terms of organizing work. When we lay the stages in the development of measurement next to the structure of modern organizations, we again find a parallel between the survey, geometry, or mathematics sequence and the levels of hierarchy-as seen in Figure 1 .
In modern organizations, structure imitates and freezes stages in the history of measurement. Husserl's hypothetical history suggests a potential explanation for the separation and hierarchizing of the types of knowledges. In short, there may be a reason in the history of measurement why the knowledge structure of the modern organization is as it is. The development of the individual organization recapitulates the development of measurement itself. The organization is begun by people who knew what they were doing (the work) and is rationalized by objective measurement into a system of objective knowledge (the job) by the likes of Frederick Taylor, behind whom already lurks a financier named Wharton who cares only about the quarterly numbers and knows nothing of either job or work.
Organizational ontology replicates measurement history. The advantage of this explanation for the observed existence of three kinds of knowledge in modern organizations is that it stops us from treating as an anomaly the irruptions of math-based, criterion-setting judgments into the workplace. We can now expect but refuse to treat as perfectly normal the dominance of external standards. Such standards make a claim of being superior to objective considerations based on conceptualizing the empirical piece of work to be done.
We can now also expect a steady pull of knowledge and power away from hands-on practical experience. Abandoning experience, idealization proceeds first toward the objective level favoring midmanagement experiments. The test is whether a concept can most efficiently capture many similar experiences. This stage then yields to the next: to the totally idealized abstractions of executive reasoning. These may look good in the stock market or the legislature but may contain nothing of the content of midmanagerial or working knowledge. A babble of abstractions yields a sound and fury that knows nothing of those who moil and toil.
At the working level, we will from now on expect the knowledge of the worker to be denigrated and subordinated to both midmanagerial conceptualization of the actual work into objects called jobs and to the numbers dictated from the top.
At the managerial level, there still is an opportunity for conceptual knowledge to take into account both the reasoning at the top (must please financial markets, must stay within budget) and the know-how at the bottom. Here the manager now will understand what he or she already knows: the workings of a superior force that is keeping him or her from conceiv- ing and implementing a proper or optimal way of producing a product or a service. Similarly, we will consider normal the conflict between what workers know as required by their work and how managers abstract from that work, generalize working routines, and redefine the work as the job. Finally, top management will be confirmed in its suspicions that "the workers are up to something." The suspicion is borne out also in the top's relation to the middle. Both midmanagement and the workers work within knowledge systems different from that of the top. For them, there is the very good reason that the appeal of conceptualization and of the work itself is direct, immediate. It can be brought under control from the top only by giving up part of one's sense of the reality one inhabits.
SOCIETY-WIDE MISMEASURE
In society at large, too, the same effects determine reality. Mathematical formulas divide and convert all human experience into numbers. Pigs are converted into chickens under equivalent market value. Labor and capital can be calculated as being the same if calculated in terms of equal units of investment. Politics is reduced to one-man, one-vote formulas. Social welfare workers' qualitative concerns for care become represented by quantity masked by equal numbers of caseload. The individual patient is generalized into diagnosis-related groups in which all caesarians and all appendectomies are created equal so that an insurance company can calculate risk and profit. Teachers become full-time equivalents. Students, enrollments. The autistic child, a budget number.
The effect on all of our being human is perhaps most poignantly expressed in an Indian priest's comment on American outsourcing of requests for prayer to India: "The prayer is heart-felt, and every prayer is treated as the same whether it is paid for in dollars, euros or in rupees" (The Rev. Paul Thelakkat, cited in Rai, 2004, p. 13) .
Knowledge can now be universally measured by being redefined and reduced to units of information: bytes and data. Next thing we know, we speak of knowledge capital, having lost all touch with how such capital comes to be.
We begin to treat all areas of human life as equally susceptible to being captured in standard units of measurement. A barrier is erected against noticing the particular and the different, innovation and discovery. Eventually, the lack of these goes unnoticed as we all succumb to universal mathematization. Hummel / TRIUMPH OF NUMBERS 73 
